The story of
AIG and its
bailout has taken on new legs. A story from Bloomberg highlighted what happened last fall, when AIG was bailed out by the government. AIG, as you know, had sold
credit default swaps, which are basically insurance against various securities losing value. Much of the debt that AIG insured were
subprime collateralized
debt obligations (
CDO), which had plunged in value during 2008.
On September 15,
Lehman Brothers filed for
bankruptcy. This caused the value of the
CDOs insured by AIG to drop even more.
By September 16, AIG was running out of cash. Payments to the counterparties to AIG's credit default swaps were draining AIG's reserves. The government, fearing the repercussions of AIG filing for chapter 11 after seeing the carnage that Lehman's failure caused,
stepped in with at $85 billion line of credit from the New York Fed, which was headed then by the man who became
the Treasury secretary,
Timothy Geithner. Eventually, the government's rescue of AIG would end up costing the taxpayers $182 billion.
AIG deployed some of its staff to renegotiate the payments due for the credit default swaps it issued. The goal was to cut the amount of money that the companies that had paid for the insurance by about 40 percent. Nobody knows how these negotiations went, because that information has not been disclosed.
In early November, however, the New York Fed stepped in and took
over negotiations, assisted by Hank Paulson's Treasury department and Ben
Bernanke's
Federal Reserve. After about a week of negotiations, the New York Fed decided to pay AIG's counterparties everything they were contractually owed. This meant that companies like
Goldman Sachs,
Merrill Lynch,
Societe Generale, and
Deutsche Bank received billions.
Some say that there is no way that AIG and the New York Fed should have paid those credit default swaps at par. They argue that AIG was bankrupt, and that Citi accepted 60 cents on the dollar to retire a credit default swap that a bankrupt company had issued on a CDO. That thinking led to the headlines that many have seen. Headlines like "Geithner gave away the farm to AIG" or "Goldman profits at taxpayer expense" are all over the internet. Those who believe this line of thinking say that the New York Fed's decision cost taxpayers tens of billions.
Others say that some counterparties were in dire financial straits themselves, and they needed to be paid at par in order to stay afloat. Because of this, according to individuals close to the discussions, they demanded to be paid at par and the New York Fed did not want to cut individual deals. They also said that the New York Fed considered a number of different options, including guaranteeing the CDOs that AIG had insured. The decision to pay the credit default swaps at par, according to these individuals, was determined to be the best of several bad choices.
The former head of the St. Louis Fed defended the actions of his colleagues in New York. William Poole asked people to remember the environment that was present at the time.
For months, financial bombshells that were seen as once in a generation events were being dropped. First was the implosion of
Bear Stearns and its subsequent
takeover by
JPMorgan Chase. Then came the government takeover of
Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac. A week later, Merrill Lynch, facing a liquidity crisis, agreed to be taken over by
Bank of America. Then Lehman Brothers filed for chapter 11. A day later, the government stepped in to bail out AIG.
"I think the Federal Reserve was trying to stop the
spread of fear in the market," Poole says. "The market was
having enough trouble dealing with Lehman. If you add, on top of
that, AIG paying off some fraction of its liabilities, a system
which is already substantially frozen would freeze rock-solid."
In any case, the
TARP auditor, Neil Barofsky, will be putting together a report on whether or not AIG overpaid its counterparties. That report, which will be very closely scrutinized, could be released as early as next month.
We here take a different view than either of the groups arguing about how many cents on the dollar Goldman, Societe Generale, and the rest of AIG's counterparties should have received.
We look at it like we would look at an insurance policy an individual would purchase from an insurance company. That is, after all, what a credit default swap is -- an insurance policy. If a homeowner bought a policy from AIG's insurance division and his house burned down, would he be asked to take less than the full amount AIG promised to pay him? If someone bought a life insurance policy from AIG and died, should his widow be paid less than what AIG was contractually obligated to pay?
If a reader believes that the answer to those questions is no, then the reader needs to ask themself why they believe that one of AIG's counterparties for credit default swaps should be any different.
The only issue we have here with the New York Fed's actions is the lack of disclosure. When you're spending tens of billions of taxpayer money, you need to disclose why you made certain decisions. Who were the counterparties that needed to be paid at par so that they would not fail? Besides the idea of guaranteeing the CDOs that AIG insured with credit default swaps, what were the other alternatives?
The New York Fed could have saved itself a lot of trouble by disclosing this information. Instead of this becoming a "the New York Fed wanted to enrich Goldman" story, it could have been a "the New York Fed helped prevent the bankruptcy of companies X, Y, and Z" story.